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Abstract: What kind of phenomenon is it when ordinary people in the 
United Kingdom unexpectedly abide by government advice on social 
distancing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, even anticipating 
constraints on their activities? These happenings demand that we engage 
anthropologically with compliance – acts or activities that conform, submit 
or adapt to rules or to the demands of others. At present, there is no ‘an-
thropology of compliance’. Rather, the discipline has inherited traditions 
of thought about compliance – as a necessary aspect of sociability or a 
morally suspect complicity, demanding resistance. These assumptions 
remain unexamined, but profoundly shape anthropological scholar-
ship. This introduction aims to show how and why compliance might 
be a useful heuristic for anthropology. We define compliance as that set 
of means by which actors strive to accommodate themselves to others in their 
collective life. We argue that this conception of compliance allows us to 
multiply the kinds of phenomena we can call ‘political’. It allows us to 
think about the political constitution of ‘radical’ difference, but to avoid 
making people identical with their cultural or conceptual worlds. By 
showing what compliance is and how it operates in and on social life, we 
ought therefore to be able to recover both specific forms of suffering and 
inequality and the ways in which social lives are constitutively different.
Keywords: anthropology, compliance, COVID-19, collective life, social 
life, tyranny
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Following rules, submitting to demands or requirements, and accom-
modating oneself to others has been a central feature of the lives of vast 
numbers of people in recent times. This is evidently true for people 
across the world, who have experienced a variety of restrictions on their 
daily activities as governments, health officials and supra-national or-
ganisations have grappled with the novel coronavirus pandemic.
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In the United Kingdom, citizens’ positive response to restrictions 
on their movement and social contacts, first imposed on 23 March 
2020, took the government, at least initially, by surprise. Government 
planning as late as the second week of March presumed that compli-
ance with social distancing would be as low as 50 per cent, with only 
a marginal benefit (Freedman 2020: 71n73), and the Health Secretary, 
Matt Hancock, voiced his concerns that restrictions would be under-
mined by ‘behavioural fatigue’ (Freedman 2020: 61). However, ordinary 
British people were unexpectedly willing for their lives to be locked 
down, to the extent that for many a functional lockdown was in place 
long before it was officially required. By 18 March, five days before a 
national lockdown was first imposed, traffic volumes in London had 
fallen by 40 per cent (Freedman 2020: 73n96) and organisations like the 
Football Association had already cancelled public events (Freedman 
2020: 72n86). Although responses to restrictions have been and remain 
varied, there was evidently a kind of spontaneous willingness to adapt 
to the predicament of the pandemic. The sorts of restrictions that ordi-
nary people adopted in their daily lives were also effective. Lawrence 
Freedman argues that ‘changes in behaviour were having an effect well 
before 23 March [when lockdown restrictions were imposed], especially 
in London’ (2020: 58). At least initially, public ‘compliance’ with restric-
tions was, evidently, not straightforwardly a response to rules, regula-
tions or UK government guidance.1
In April 2021, the Office for National Statistics (2021) published a 
report, acknowledging that ‘overall, compliance was high and many 
participants in the study had a good awareness of . . . government guid-
ance . . . and of how the coronavirus spreads’. The guidance in question, 
‘hands, face, space’, referred to vectors of viral transmission, namely 
from surfaces (hands and face) and as an aerosol (space). All of these 
vectors, and the rationales behind them, referred to modes of connec-
tion between people – the surfaces they touched, the physical contacts 
that they had with others, and the common air that they breathed. 
Restrictions, in turn, were designed to minimise these contacts and 
manage connections as a means of limiting viral spread. Regardless 
of whether people complied with the government’s guidance, these 
restrictions therefore drew attention to the ways in which people were 
linked to one another. Similarly, the vicissitudes of the lockdown high-
lighted the significant role of newly christened ‘key workers’ in deliver-
ing food and goods, providing health and social care, and performing 
other important services. Such work in mediating and maintaining 
other aspects of social life rose to prominence and was recognised as 
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people turned out onto their doorsteps to ‘clap for heroes’ on Thursday 
evenings in honour of NHS workers, for example. These results suggest 
a popular awareness of the significance of social relations and their 
management as the stuff from which lives are built.
It is in this context that we raise the question of compliance. Com-
pliance is a pregnant term in several respects. Its Latin root, complire, 
covers the senses of ‘to fill up, fulfil, accomplish, complete’. The notion 
of compliance emerged in English in the seventeenth century as ‘com-
pleasance’ or ‘complaisance’, clearly carrying the sense of obligation 
implicit in the Latin. Thomas Hobbes writes about compleasance in 
Leviathan (1909: 116–117, original emphasis), where it is discussed as ‘A 
fifth Law of Nature: COMPLEASANCE: that is to say, That every man 
strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest . . . The observers of this Law, 
may be called SOCIABLE, . . . The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, 
Intractable’. In Hobbes’ terms, as in the context of the pandemic, com-
pliance is a marker of sociability, an awareness of obligations or duties 
that aims towards accommodation with others. Compliance, in other 
words, suggests the activity of fitting oneself in relation to others for a 
particular mode of life, in contrast to the ‘Stubborn, Insociable, Froward’ 
and ‘Intractable’.
Correspondingly, other near-contemporary usages make ‘compli-
ance’ mean the ability to bend or physically fit another object, as a cork 
‘complies’ with the neck of a bottle, and ‘to comply’ could also mean 
to weave or braid. This sense of physical accommodation is retained in 
the physical sciences, where compliance denotes ‘the property of a body 
or substance of yielding to an applied force or of allowing a change 
to be made in its shape; also, the degree of yielding, measured by the 
displacement produced by a unit change in the force’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2021). Compliance, in other words, indicates tractability, 
being able to live or work with others, or the capacity to fit, yield or 
take an impression (see also Milton 1667: 603).
From the time of its coining, however, compliance has carried other 
meanings. Around the time of the trial and subsequent execution of 
Charles I, John Milton wrote The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649a). 
He saw Charles I as a tyrant and was in favour of the formation of a re-
public. He begins his book with the following sentence: ‘If Men within 
themselves would be govern’d by reason, and not generally give up 
their understanding to a double tyrannie, of Custome from without, 
and blind affections within, they would discerne better, what it is to 
favour and uphold the Tyrant of a Nation’. A few sentences later, he 
draws on the idea of compliance to highlight the passivity exercised 
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by ‘bad’ people in the face of tyranny: ‘Consequentlie neither doe 
bad men hate Tirants, but have been alwaies readiest with the falsifi’d 
names of Loyalty and Obedience, to colour over their base compliances’ 
(1649a: 1). In Milton’s terms, compliance stood for falsity, sycophancy 
and surrender.
This morally questionable character of compliance was highlighted 
by later authors as well. Two centuries after Milton wrote, compliance 
was still being used pejoratively. In a speech that addresses local po-
litical issues in Boston, and what he sees as an ineffective array of ap-
pointed officials, the American abolitionist Wendell Phillips notes that 
‘[a]ll politics necessitates questionable compliances; but this serfdom 
touches a base depth’ (1863: 498). Similar ideas have been voiced in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, London mayoral can-
didate Piers Corbyn was arrested in February 2021 in connection with a 
campaign flyer equating the United Kingdom’s vaccination programme 
to the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz (BBC News 2021). Such equations 
are typical of ‘COVID-sceptical’ politics. From this perspective, com-
pliance with government policy would represent acquiesence in tyr-
anny. ‘Base’ compliance, in other words, represents a potential failure 
of independent thought and action, a ‘blind affection’ robbing people 
of freedom and agency, instilling a morally questionable ‘complicity’.
Compliance, then, suggests a series of issues for anthropologists. 
First, it raises questions around meaning. As Milton’s ‘base’ compli-
ance, it invites attention to politics, resistance and agency, especially 
as they concern the apparent moral value of subjects as independent 
agents. However, as Hobbes stresses in his account of compleasance 
as a ‘fifth law of nature’, people may also ‘strive’ to be compliant. As 
such, compliance might itself be thought of as a project or activity of 
self-shaping (cf. Foucault 1994; Laidlaw 2014). Especially in this regard, 
compliance points to the quality of tractability in social life, the capac-
ity of actors – human and perhaps also non-human – and their efforts 
to accommodate themselves to one another’s demands in striving to 
become ‘sociable’ in Hobbes’ terms. In connection with the surprising 
levels of compliance with COVID-19 restrictions in the United King-
dom, this leads us to approach compliance as an ethnographic question: 
who complies, how, and with what, exactly?
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Anthropology and compliance
Beyond its topical relevance, thinking about compliance anthropolog-
ically is interesting because no generalised, contemporary anthropol-
ogy of compliance exists. Compliance appears in the anthropological 
literature mainly in connection with medicine, tax and corporate affairs 
– all contexts in which compliance is a term used by the people anthro-
pologists study, and which feature in several of the articles assembled 
here. There is very little contemporary anthropological material that 
focusses explicitly on, for example, why people follow the law,2 or why 
juniors obey seniors in kinship relations, for example.3 Compliance in a 
general sense has never become an important object of anthropological 
study. Our aim here is to argue that it should be, and to demonstrate 
its potential value.
The lack of an anthropology of compliance stands in stark contrast 
to psychology (famously, Milgram 1963). Psychologists have produced 
material on compliance in medical (e.g. Radley 1994) and business set-
tings (e.g. Damayanti et al. 2015; Wenzel 2005), as anthropologists have. 
They have also considered sales strategies (e.g. Burger 1986; Cialdini et 
al. 1978), kinship (e.g. Sundie et al. 2012), survey responses (e.g. Petrova 
et al. 2007) and many other topics from the perspective of compliance. 
The range of contexts in which the term crops up in psychology indi-
cates a key difference between the idea of compliance in that discipline 
and in anthropology: for psychologists, the question of what compli-
ance is and what it does is generative, in the sense that pursuing it 
opens up insight and further lines of enquiry about many aspects of 
human social relations (e.g. Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Cialdini and 
Trost 1998), whereas anthropologists, as we argue below, have tended 
to take (non-)compliance for granted. Given that the question of how 
social relations work is equally relevant to both psychologists and an-
thropologists, why have anthropologists not adopted this standpoint?
An important reason for its neglect as an object of anthropological 
study is certainly the way in which compliance has been understood 
and evaluated as a relationship. Here again, Hobbes and Milton stand 
usefully for two poles of moral evaluation. For Hobbes, compliance 
is necessary for the conduct of social life; for Milton, by contrast, to 
comply is to lose a certain independence and, potentially, standing 
as a moral subject. Their different views of compliance are in turn 
traceable to judgements on the moral qualities of government and the 
state. Hobbes’ argument in Leviathan is well known: the power of the 
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 sovereign is required to guarantee a peaceful and orderly society; it 
exists by the transfer to the sovereign of individual people’s rights and 
capacities, especially to employ violence. Hobbes’ compliance is there-
fore readable as a legitimate limitation of individual agency. Milton’s 
view opposes Hobbes’ directly. In Eikonoklastēs, a tract composed for 
the Commonwealth government that ruled England after the execution 
of Charles I, and rebutting directly Charles’ justification of his conduct 
before and during the Civil War, Milton contends:
He [Charles I] confesses a rational sovrantie of soule and freedom of will 
in every man, and yet with an implicit repugnancy would have his reason 
the sovran of that sovranty, and would captivate and make useless that 
natural freedom of will in all other men but himself. But them that yeeld 
him this obedience he so well rewards, as to pronounce them worthy to 
be Slaves. They who have lost all to be his Subjects, may stoop and take 
up the reward. (Milton 1694b)
Milton and Hobbes thus both envisage compliance as a limitation of 
individual freedom and capacity to act; they differ only in their as-
sessment of its value. For Hobbes, submission is necessary to the or-
derly Commonwealth, whereas for Milton it represents an illegitimate 
imposition.
These contrasting evaluations evidently map closely onto conven-
tional and deep-rooted social scientific distinctions between structure 
and agency. Marshall Sahlins has argued (1996) that they also corre-
spond to a deep mythic structure of Western European thought and cul-
ture, articulated in the narrative of the Fall of Man, which he suggests 
resonates through modern social thought. For Sahlins, the question of 
the value of individual free will arises from the Fall because it was 
Adam’s wilful act of eating of the tree of knowledge that created want 
and scarcity. Freedom was therefore sinful for St Augustine (1998) and 
other early Christian thinkers, and to be minutely managed by spiritual 
directors given pastoral responsibility for their flock (Foucault 1995: 
139ff; 2009). Compliance with such spiritual direction was the essence 
of virtue.
As Michel Foucault (2009) documents, the upheavals of the seven-
teenth century in Europe – exactly the period of Hobbes and Milton – 
saw ‘pastoral’ modes of control, derived from spiritual direction, 
extended from ecclesiastical affairs to secular matters. At the same time, 
free will was reimagined. It was no longer necessarily sinful, but a fact 
of life to be managed (Sahlins 1996: 398). This management was often 
modelled on the work of spiritual direction and the compliance of the 
penitent or disciple. It developed into forms of disciplinary practice 
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that sought order in timely and minutely choreographed movements 
( Foucault 1995; Mitchell 1988). From the late eighteenth century, emerg-
ing forms of discipline, applied to soldiers, factory workers and school 
children, aimed to order the placement and movements of the people 
they were applied to, rendering their activities transparent and acces-
sible to analysis (Foucault 1995: 143). The purpose of these disciplines 
was to forge order out of chaos, much as scientists of the so-called 
‘ classical age’ sought to tabulate and order species of plants, animals 
and rocks (Foucault 1970). Compliance here shifts from religious virtue 
to social order and efficiency.
However, by the end of the eighteenth century an alternative line of 
thinking was developing, one which located social order differently and 
made different demands of the compliance–freedom dyad. In various 
disciplines, hidden, internal orders were discovered in the phenomena 
of the world which seemed to give them an internal, spontaneous order, 
above and beyond attempts to govern them (Foucault 1970). Capital and 
the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith 1999) of the market in economics serves, for 
Sahlins (1996), as the model for this tendency (see also Foucault 1970). 
From this point of view, as in Milton’s earlier position, free will is inher-
ently good, and the role of government is not to dominate it, as in pasto-
ral discipline, but to liberate it. As Sahlins comments, this was original 
sin ‘bourgeoisified’ as ‘rational choice’, providing ‘a more cheerful view 
of the material opportunities afforded by human suffering’ (1996: 397). 
The moral loads of free will and compliance were thus reversed, and 
freedom as opposed to compliance (following ‘tradition’, for example) 
became the ultimate source of virtue.
Between these two poles of moral evaluation lies the problem for 
studying compliance anthropologically. Compliance and its relation 
to agency does not appear as a phenomenon to be studied, but as the 
foundational concept for different visions of social life. In the Miltonian 
idiom that runs through Smith and Milton Friedman, human freedom 
and agency are the prime movers of social life. People’s freedom to act 
as consumers and investors produces the inherent and efficient logic of 
the market, which should be extended to all sorts of services (power, 
water, rail, education, welfare, child care ‘choices’, etc). In this tradition, 
arbitrary systems of control, such as that proposed by Hobbes,4 should 
be limited to guaranteeing the ‘natural’ operations of markets, to which 
they should be subservient. Compliance with such systems of control is 
therefore suspect – the ‘slavery’ that Milton sees following submission 
to the King in Eikonoklastēs is evidently on Friedrich von Hayek’s Road 
to Serfdom (2007).
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Conversely, Hobbes’ vision of compliance and the limitation of free-
dom as the necessary price of order against chaos is obviously echoed 
in eighteenth-century French thought (Montesquieu 1989; Rousseau 
1997). Early anthropology is likewise shot through with the notion, 
especially in speculations concerning the control of ‘primitive promis-
cuity’ and the development of regulated forms of marriage and kinship 
(Gluckman 1965 [provides a summary]; Maine 1977; Morgan 2000). The 
two streams join in Émile Durkheim’s (1915) notion of the collective 
conscience and Marcel Mauss’ (2002) account of the obligations of gift 
exchange, in which compliance serves, exactly as in Hobbes, to make 
people ‘sociable’ and thus to found society. For anthropologists who 
have inherited this intellectual history, compliance is a necessary com-
ponent of social analysis, but, as we argue below, it is very difficult to 
bring into focus as an object of study.
Hobbesean anthropology
For a long time, anthropology operated in a Hobbesean mode, medi-
ated by Durkheim. In the years 1894–1895, Durkheim gave a course of 
lectures on Hobbes’ 1642 book, De Cive, originally written in Latin but 
translated into English in 1651 under the title Philosophicall Rudiments 
Concerning Government and Society (Hobbes 1978), which anticipates 
themes elaborated in Leviathan. The famous phrase bellum omnium contra 
omnes (‘war of all against all’) appeared first in De Cive. Hobbes was of 
interest to Durkheim because of the latter’s abiding concern with the 
issue of ‘social cohesion’ (Eloire 2011).
Durkheim had published The Division of Labour in Society in 1893 
(Durkheim 1984) and was working on Rules of the Sociological Method, ul-
timately published in 1895 (Durkheim 1938). He was concerned to place 
the then nascent discipline of sociology in historical and philosophical 
perspective. Durkheim saw in Hobbes’ writing a way of scientifically 
understanding society and of providing an objective point of view on 
the social. For Durkheim, the fundamental rule of sociology was that 
social facts must be considered as things, and he understood Hobbes 
as applying this rule in his writing. But Durkheim also highlighted the 
contractarianism of Hobbes, which meant that he could not see that 
social facts had to be explained by other social facts and was confined 
to an individualistic reasoning.
According to Durkheim’s interpretation of Hobbes, society is not a 
product of human nature. If the pre-social state of nature had existed, 
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chronic war would have resulted due to the natural equality of men, 
inhibiting their capacity to organise. Society is therefore the product of 
reason, obliging individuals together through mutually binding con-
tracts. These inter-individual relations are, in turn, connected with an-
other set of binding relations that unites each individual to recognised 
power through an independent allocation of rights. Hobbes’ theory of 
the state is of an institution that is not natural but social. The question 
for Durkheim, then, was one of what relationships between ‘social facts’ 
would account for the form of society.
The anthropology that developed under Durkheim’s influence, es-
pecially in Britain, was concerned with the orderliness or ‘cohesion’ of 
‘primitive societies’ (Evans-Pritchard 1940), where order was under-
stood as a necessary good (Strathern 1985). Primitive societies were 
interesting both because their orderliness was a surprise considering 
their ‘savagery’ (Malinowski 1926), and because it was thought that 
in examining the principles of their order, which were assumed to be 
restricted by their limited scale, a general theory of social life might 
be possible (Fortes 2017; Gluckman 1965). The problem was to find out 
what made order possible, necessary and enduring. Considering the 
various ways in which other people organised their social lives, it was 
evident, as Meyer Fortes observed, that ‘social cohesion . . . is achieved 
by specific social mechanisms’ (1936: 604), as Durkheim had argued.
Ultimately, the mechanisms of cohesion were to be found in ac-
counts of ‘custom’ (Gluckman 1965) or, analogously, in rights and 
obligations defined by systems of descent and kinship (Fortes 2017). 
Societies were ordered – and ordered differently to one another – be-
cause they had different customs. Clearly, for customs to have the effect 
of producing distinctive social orders, people must comply with them. 
As Durkheim (1952) had already demonstrated, social regularities could 
be explained neither by exogenous factors such as climate, nor by in-
dividual choice, which would produce random and not regular effects. 
They were rather the product of people’s compliance with exterior and 
compulsory norms (Durkheim 1938). As in Hobbes, sociability involved 
submission. Since compliance was a taken-for-granted mechanism in 
Durkheimian theories of society, it was not itself available for study. 
Even in legal anthropology, the reasons for which people comply and 
the means by which they are brought to do so were obscured or ex-
cluded from the purview of the discipline. ‘Why an individual for emo-
tional and intellectual reasons conforms to the code and discharges his 
obligations,’ declared Max Gluckman, ‘is a problem for psychologists’ 
(1965: 202), and thus of no interest to anthropology.
wu Will Rollason and ERic HiRscH
10
The Miltonian turn
Even as Gluckman was writing, however, the ground was already shift-
ing. Anthropology was taking a Miltonian turn, in which compliance 
would come to be seen as ‘base,’ morally questionable and academically 
uninteresting. In 1968, Edwin Ardener (2006) presented his paper ‘Belief 
and the problem of women’ at University College London. In it, he 
argued that ‘custom’ was understood differently by men and women, 
and that it mattered from whom anthropologists drew the information 
on which they based their models of social structure. Feminist anthro-
pologists rapidly developed this and similar ideas, exploring the ways 
in which cultural and social systems operated not in the interests of 
cohesion, but as forms of patriarchal domination (Moore 1988 [provides 
a summary]; Ortner 1974; Rubin 1975; Strathern 1988).
At the same time, ‘primitive societies’ as the object of anthropo-
logical study and the sites of custom were also slipping away. Decolo-
nisation meant that they could no longer be imagined as distinct from 
the ‘modern’ states that they were part of (e.g. Epstein 1981) and whose 
governments were often intolerant of ‘tribalism’ (Asad 1998). Likewise, 
scholars from the ex-colonies as well as the metropole were develop-
ing critical accounts of the violence of colonialism and the connections 
between knowledge – including anthropological knowledge – and 
colonial power (Fabian 1983; Robbins 2013; Said 2003). As in feminist 
accounts, the ‘mechanisms of social cohesion’ identified by Fortes and 
other structural-functional5 anthropologists appeared, in the light of 
this scholarship, to be inextricably connected to colonialism – both as 
an instrument of power and a product of the colonial imagination. By 
the beginning of the 1990s, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1991) concluded 
that anthropology’s location in the ‘savage slot’ was no longer tenable: 
‘primitive societies’ bound by custom could not be the object of the 
discipline, or used in the interests of a Western study of social life in 
general.
Anthropology’s response to these developments was halting and 
confused by the various lines of critique involved, which covered a 
gamut of issues from authorship to the mechanics of colonial power. 
However, Joel Robbins (2013) argues that the upshot of the turmoil of 
the period 1970–1990 was a shift of focus towards the subject and a re-
treat from the idea of structure (see Urla and Helepololei 2014). Robbins 
states: ‘Anthropology was in the early 1990s changing its relation to 
those it studied from one of analytic distance and critical comparison 
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focused on difference to one of empathic connection and moral witness-
ing based on human unity’ (2013: 453, emphasis added). Robbins argues 
that the universality of the human was established through a focus on 
suffering as a common experience, leading to anthropologists bearing 
compassionate witness to others as fellow people.
If people were everywhere the same, as evidenced in their capacity 
to suffer, then it followed that they had to be separable from the very 
different social and cultural circumstances under which they lived. 
The unity of humanity therefore tended to establish an oppositional 
relationship between people and the social and cultural systems they 
inhabited – one which in many respects echoes Gluckman’s (1965) dis-
missal of the motives and interests of the subjects of anthropological 
study. Social life varied, but humanity was constant. Logically, then, 
this ‘anthropology of the suffering subject’ (Robbins 2013) was one that 
treated socio-cultural variation as an epiphenomenon to humanity, 
not constitutive of it.6 As had been the case for Durkheim (1938), socio- 
cultural systems were external to human subjects, surrounding them as 
a constraining environment that they negotiated tactically (de Certeau 
1984). Agency could be registered only against this background. Cor-
respondingly, as in James Scott’s (1990, 1998) influential work, human 
life as such, and especially the inner lives of subjects, came to be seen 
as inherently ungovernable and resistant to the systems that were im-
posed on people (see Mitchell 1990). Where local cultural lives were cel-
ebrated, these commonly took the form of a kind of resistant, everyday 
know-how or mētis (Dresch and Scheele 2015; Scott 1998), ranged against 
larger-scale or dominant systems of power. In this context, anthropol-
ogists sought out instances of ‘everyday resistance’ as evidence of the 
vitality and agency of their subjects (Abu-Lughod 1990). Resistance was 
the corollary of common humanity and the Leitmotif of a generation of 
anthropological work (Brown 1996; Ortner 1995, 1997).
The central place that resistance had achieved in anthropology 
by the 1990s has been extremely durable. This was partly the result of 
historical events – notably responses to the 2008 financial crash and 
the Arab Spring of 2011. In the aftermath of these events, Dimitrios 
Theodossopoulos suggests a retreat from the notion, but not very far:
The concept of resistance was not that long ago a great source of inspira-
tion for anthropology. More recently, however, anthropological interest 
has shifted to a variety of related topics: urban protest, insurrectionary 
movements, anti-austerity mobilization, and the increasing discontent 
with hegemonic economic policies. (Theodossopoulos 2014: 415–416)
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Resistance remains close to the heart of the discipline. Lucas Bessire 
and David Bond define ‘the progressive orientation of anthropology’ 
in terms of ‘located descriptions of resistance, suffering, and govern-
ance’, in which the political consists in ‘operations of domination’ and 
‘struggles’ (2014: 441) over goods, rights and the significance of things.
A focus on resistance makes it very difficult to focus on compliance. 
This is because of the way in which conventional, liberal notions of 
power and resistance distribute agency. Resistance and power, agency 
and domination, subject and object are opposed in a zero-sum fashion. 
To resist is to ‘shed power,’ to achieve ‘emancipation’ (Urla and Helepo-
lolei 2014: 433). To be dominated or fail to resist from this perspective 
appears as a loss of independent agency. Marilyn Strathern observes:
Western culture imagines people as persons existing in a permanently 
subjective state; this is their natural and normal condition, and a person 
can dominate another by depriving him or her of the proper exercise 
of that subjectivity. . . Thus a . . . subject can be turned into an object. 
( Strathern 1988: 388)
As a result, an anthropology committed to defending and advocating 
for the people it studies finds it hard to talk about compliance. Compli-
ant behaviour is liable to take the form of a background against which 
ethnographic subjects will appear by virtue of their non-compliance, re-
sistance or subversion. Saba Mahmood (2001: 203), for example, observes 
that agency is viewed by feminist anthropologists especially as ‘a syn-
onym for resistance to relations of domination’. By this metric, people 
who do as they are told cannot be fully fledged agents or proper sub-
jects – for themselves, or therefore for ethnography. Similarly, anthro-
pologists began to frame the cultural and social systems they studied as 
rejoinders to modernity (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff 1993), capitalism 
(e.g. Taussig 1980, 2002), or Western epistemology (Scott 2013; Viveiros 
de Castro 2015) in order to circumvent anthropology’s tendency to dis-
tance and objectify its others as non-agents and non-subjects.
The echoes of Milton in anthropology’s turn towards resistance by 
way of common humanity are unmistakeable. Whereas for scholars like 
Fortes, following Hobbes, compliance with custom was assumed as the 
necessary basis of orderly social life, by the end of the 1990s, the po-
larities of anthropological scholarship had been reversed. Compliance 
was no longer a ‘problem for psychologists’ but the ‘base’ symptom of 
domination, the background against which political agency took shape 
and from which it had to be recovered. It was, however, no more acces-
sible to study, since the unity of humanity, predicated on subjectivity 
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and agency, defined in advance the relation between compliance and 
resistance (Holbraad 2014; Mitchell 1990).
Making compliance interesting
Our contention in this introduction is that, the history outlined above 
notwithstanding, anthropologists should be interested in compliance. 
In their introduction to Times of Security, Morten Pedersen and Martin 
Holbraad argue that all anthropology is, in one way or another, con-
cerned with security, which they define as ‘a set of discourses and 
practices concerned with a given social collective’s reproduction over 
time’ (2013: 9, emphasis removed). For them, security is synonymous 
with the enduring character of social and cultural systems, and the 
means by which they endure. Pedersen and Holbraad’s argument is 
in many ways analogous with the one presented here. They suggest 
that anthropologists have been unable to focus on security as an object 
because the conceptual framework within which they operate defines 
the relations that constitute security in advance. This relegates security 
to the analytical background.
Taking Hobbes as a model, we could equally argue that all anthro-
pology is centrally concerned with compliance as that set of means by 
which actors strive to accommodate themselves to others in their collective life, 
recognising with Hobbes that such accommodation is the basic mean-
ing of sociability and the condition of association. Compliance in this 
sense is implicit in both the ‘Hobbesean’ and ‘Miltonian’ versions of 
anthropology outlined above as the unexplored mechanism of custom 
and the background for resistance and agency, respectively. However, 
the relation that compliance names – one of subjection and the absence 
of freedom – has historically been taken for granted by anthropologists. 
‘Society’, both as a benign ‘social system’ and as a system of oppression, 
dominates its members.
Pedersen and Holbraad’s prescription for bringing security into 
focus is to attend in each ethnographic case to the nature of the social 
collective in question and the way in which that collective constitutes 
the definite time in which it reproduces itself. What, in other words, is 
being reproduced and how does that reproduction constitute the time 
in which it endures? To shift anthropological attention to compliance, 
we suggest a similar strategy. Who exactly are the actors which strive to 
accommodate themselves to others, how are they constituted as such?7 
By what means or agencies and in which media do they strive and how 
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is this striving registered or rendered visible? What is the collective life 
in question – what is associated to constitute it and by what forms of 
accommodation? To pose questions around compliance in this way is 
to recuperate some of the generative potential that the notion has in 
psychology, to make compliance central to anthropological accounts of 
collective life.
Framed like this, these questions are evidently interlinked. To ask 
about personhood is at once to raise the question both of what people do 
to relate to one another, their ‘striving’, and thus also to bring into view 
their collective life.8 Anna Berglund (this issue; 2019) clearly addresses 
this concern in her discussion of rural Rwandans’ compliance with gov-
ernment agricultural policies. These policies, which have often been 
harshly enforced (Ansoms and Cioffo 2018), have caused peasants’ crop 
yields to decline, resulting in shortages of food and declining standards 
of living. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Malay peasants described by 
Scott (1985, 1987), they complied as far as they were able with policy de-
mands (cf. Palmer 2014). Berglund argues that her interlocutors’ compli-
ance was not the result of their very real powerlessness, but a reflection 
of the ways in which villagers’ ideas, values and practices overlapped 
with oppressive state projects. Villagers understood themselves as poor 
people – a condition of moral inferiority and shame as well as material 
want. Compliance with state policy, for them, was not an imposition, 
despite the fact that it ran counter to their material interests. Rather, it 
represented an opportunity to engage with a transformative project 
through which they could create a position for themselves as people of 
value in a larger community. This notion of the poor person is ethno-
graphically specific – it is not generalisable as Robbins’ (2013) ‘suffering 
subject’ – and conditions relations of compliance. At the same time, 
it serves to account for the apparently counter-intuitive way in which 
rural Rwandans work with a government that works against them – 
that is, the mode of their ‘striving’ to relate to others. In the process, 
the analysis serves to map out crucial relations constituting Rwandan 
social life more broadly, especially between the rural majority and the 
powerful and often overbearing apparatus of government (Thomson 
2018), without collapsing into ready-made tropes of oppression.
Similarly, to think about the media and agencies through which re-
lations of compliance operate demands that we engage with the persons 
who are assumed, conditioned, given capacities and connected through 
compliance – and through accounting for such connections, again, 
to approach a characterisation of collective life as a whole.  Jonathan 
Stadler’s contribution to this issue is focussed exactly on the media of 
15
Politics, sociability and tHE constitution of collEctivE lifE tv
compliance in clinical trials. His essay concerns a ‘smart pill box’ called 
a Medication Event Reminder Monitoring (MERM) device, which is de-
signed to improve compliance with a new TB prophylaxis regime in a 
South African township. The MERM was a pill container equipped with 
a microchip. It recorded when it was opened and issued reminders to 
patients to take medication. Stadler argues that the MERM served to 
facilitate compliance with the testing regimen, and that the device itself 
became a focus of attention during the trial. But it also had the effect 
of constituting patients as persons in multiple ways. For clinicians, it 
established patients as unreliable, forgetful and dishonest, even as it 
worked to control these tendencies in them. Patients, in their relations 
with the MERM device, endowed it with humanness, drawing attention 
to their own suffering and need for care. In turn, the MERM provided 
divergent perspectives on collective life as a whole. For the medics run-
ning the trial, its technical emphasis on ensuring patients remembered 
their medication and on preventing their lying about taking it made the 
political economics of TB and HIV – which are closely connected with 
poverty – invisible. Conversely, for patients, the MERM, as a quasi-hu-
man offering a kind of care, reflected local awareness of inequality and 
constructs of TB as a disease of poverty and pollution.
Seen as an association or accommodation, collective life as a whole 
can be specified in terms of compliance: the things and people it asso-
ciates, the nature of the connections between them, and the ways in 
which these connections are rendered visible or registered (cf. Latour 
2005). Although none of the articles in this issue attempt such a totalis-
ing perspective, Lotta Björklund Larsen and Benedicte Brøgger’s con-
tribution is emblematic in these terms. They examine tax compliance 
policy and practice pertaining to Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs), a 
fraught and contentious area of policy. Their focus is on ‘co-operative 
compliance’ regimes in Norway and Sweden that are underpinned by 
OECD tax compliance methodologies. These schemes are intended to 
engage large MNEs with the aim of increasing compliance. Although 
these Norwegian and Swedish schemes are based on the same OECD 
template and exist in very similar political and fiscal contexts, Larsen 
and Brøgger demonstrate that they operated very differently. The 
source of this difference, they show, lies in the way in which compli-
ance with tax implicates history, culture, institutions and systems of 
regulation. Crucially, compliance in these cases both conditions and 
is conditioned by relations between corporate executives and govern-
ment tax administrators, and affects the obligations and  responsibilities 
 imagined  between taxpayers and society at large. These diverse factors 
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do not only bear on compliance, but are mobilised in the ways in which 
MNEs do and do not comply, such that they are made visible and ac-
tivated in the construction of social life. This case suggests how the 
accommodations that compliance entails create the associations that 
constitute collective life.9
Assembling the political
Attending to compliance in this way therefore offers a vantage point 
from which to generate a picture of collective life. Of course, this is not 
the only way in which this might be done. All anthropological theories 
– all social theories, for that matter – aim to model social life in some 
way. To be compelling, a case for an anthropology of compliance needs 
to demonstrate that the concept does intellectual work in an efficient 
way, that it is a useful heuristic (Candea 2019).
Part of the justification for attending to compliance must be topical. 
Compliance as we have set the notion out here seems to offer an effective 
engagement with the interlinked crises of the environment, politics and 
health that mark the contemporary era (Latour 2017, 2018). At the time 
of writing, it is difficult to say with any certainty what, if any, lasting 
impact the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic will have on anthro-
pology. However, the early indications are that it is prompting renewed 
interest in interconnections, networks and the co-construction of per-
sons, agencies and bodies (e.g. Briggs 2020; Faas et al. 2020; Hardy 2020; 
Higgins et al. 2020; Kirksey 2020) of the kind often studied by anthro-
pologists of multi-species engagement and the Anthropocene ( Kirksey 
2014; Kohn 2007; Tsing 2017), or those influenced by Actor–Network 
Theory (ANT) and the ‘sociology of associations’ promoted by Bruno 
Latour (2005). Anthropology, in other words, seems to be responding to 
a widely distributed sense of the cardinal significance of relations of all 
kinds – with both human and non-human entities – to the business of 
life, and of the responsibilities that these connections imply.
Such approaches, however, are often criticised for neglecting pol-
itics, especially the kinds of political struggles commonly identified 
with a paradigm of anthropology focussed (albeit in different ways) 
on resistance (Bessire and Bond 2014; Gregory 2014; Hornborg 2017a, 
2017b; Kipnis 2015; Martin 2014). Latour (2004, 2005) rejects this critique, 
arguing that the work of association, since it forms collectivities and 
the capacities of actors, is inherently political (see also Haraway 2016). 
Latour’s (2005) objections to critical sociologists’ (and by extension an-
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thropologists’) ‘discovery’ of ready-made mechanisms of power, op-
pression and resistance operating under the surface of collective life are 
well founded. However, it also seems to be the case that the breadth of 
the notion of politics he proposes means that he fails to engage directly 
with the kind of ‘politics’ his critics are pointing to, namely contests 
over meanings, rights and values undertaken discursively in a public 
space (cf. Habermas 2011). There is room to doubt whether that anthro-
pocentric vision of politics is exhaustive (de la Cadena 2010), but it is 
certainly significant.
Compliance invites us to attend to how and to what extent people 
strive to accommodate themselves to one another in collective life. Our 
case is that the people and other actors involved in relations of compli-
ance are to an important extent brought into being by the ways in which 
they comply or fail to do so, along with the means by which they relate 
to one another and thus the whole of collective life. This perspective 
offers to bring the straightforwardly ‘political’ (public, discursive, con-
cerned with policy) into an anthropology focussed on relationships and 
the constitution of diverse forms of life. It does this by demonstrating 
the ways in which the government of people, their mobilisation in re-
sponse to demands, rules or requirements, is variable beyond the limits 
of taken-for-granted relations of domination or submission.
Steven Sampson’s article in this issue (see also Sampson 2016), 
which focusses on corporate compliance and ethics departments, effec-
tively demonstrates the possibility of the concept of compliance we have 
articulated. Since the 2000s, almost all major corporations and large 
numbers of public agencies have established ethics and compliance 
departments. This development is the product of the politics of corpo-
rate governance, especially in the United States – an area of policy that 
surged to prominence in the wake of the 2001 Enron scandal, the 2008 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the resulting financial crisis, and more 
recent examples of corporate wrongdoing, such as the 2014 Volkswagen 
emissions scandal. Business ethics is not new, as Sampson (2016) points 
out, although calls for ethical business, and against ‘amoral’ (or ‘im-
moral’) markets, always seem new as political debates swirl around the 
question of to whom, exactly, firms should be beholden. The growth of 
corporate compliance departments is novel, however, in the sense that 
they respond to states’ attempts to legislate for ethical business and, 
sometimes, to enforce those regulations.
So far, so political: public debate over the meaning and value of 
corporate action leads to rules that seek to define rights and obligations, 
and to distribute the costs and benefits of firms’ actions. However, the 
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details of corporate compliance programmes that Sampson describes 
reveal the relational assemblage (Ong and Collier 2005) through which 
this politics of corporate capitalism is actuated. This assemblage, or ‘pack-
age’ in Sampson’s terms, is focussed on embedding legal and ethical 
behaviour as part of the business activities of corporations, an inter-
nalisation of ethics, and not merely a constraint. This is achieved by 
corporations, in partnership with a vast supporting industry that has 
grown up around ethics and compliance initiatives, through strategies 
of communication. These directly affect employees, who are trained in 
ethical behaviour, since unethical activity is understood as the result 
of defective training. Since corporate compliance is ideally transparent 
and demonstrable from outside the corporation, a corporation’s ethics 
must also be communicated to shareholders and a public of ‘stake-
holders’ more broadly. This activity involves the production of codes of 
conduct, training courses, and auditable trails of activity, which include 
the production and staffing of ethics departments, as well as the modi-
fication of corporate activity to accommodate it to laws and regulations, 
and to notions of the corporation’s place within a larger moral com-
munity. Modern capitalism, Sampson observes ‘is constructing its own 
morality, with its own theory of human agency’ (2016: 84). Here, as in 
the other contributions to this collection, ‘politics’, seen through the lens 
of compliance, takes the form of an assemblage or network formed by 
people’s activity in striving to accommodate themselves to one another 
and in the process constituting themselves and their collective life.
Sincerity, suffering and difference
A politics imagined in the specific, situated form of compliance tran-
scends the opposition between Hobbes and Milton by engaging not 
with moral questions about the value of compliance, but by engaging 
with what compliance is and does. Thinking about compliance in this 
way – that is, ethnographically – and placing it at the centre of the 
analy sis allows us to think about ‘politics’ as plural: it invites a vision 
of politics as more than one type of phenomenon.
The potential multiplicity of politics is implicit in an ethnographic 
attention to compliance as we have laid it out here, because the relations 
that it entails cannot straightforwardly be reduced to the questions of 
power and submission that exercised Hobbes and Milton, and which 
have haunted anthropology. Rather, it is necessary to specify for each 
case the kinds of actors who are brought to comply, or not; the relations 
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and media in which they do so; and the collective that they are part 
of. Such an analysis also precludes taking relations of power as an ob-
viously moral or ethical issue, as scholars of resistance tend to do. In 
the framework we propose here, terms such as ‘politics’, ‘power’ and 
‘compliance’ must be treated in the first instance as heuristics, pointing 
out family resemblances amongst observed effects, whose precise di-
mensions and value remain to be specified.
Such a perspective is implicit in Isak Niehaus’ article in this issue. 
In it, he examines a public lecture entitled ‘Savages Have No Crime’, 
which was delivered by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown at Columbia Univer-
sity, where he was a visiting professor, in 1931. The lecture was given 
in a political environment that in many ways embodied the dispute 
between Hobbes and Milton, between orderly society and individual 
freedom. At the time, prohibition was in force, and gangsterism was 
surging across the United States. Although subsequently forgotten, 
Radcliffe-Brown’s lecture caught the attention of the local press at the 
time. Niehaus examines its implications for understanding Radcliffe- 
Brown’s thought, but more significant for the current argument is the 
subtext of the lecture, which appears to have been what caught the 
attention of journalists. Niehaus reads Radcliffe-Brown as issuing a 
critique of Western politics and criminal law, both in the United States 
and in the British Empire. For Radcliffe-Brown, oppressive laws and 
criminal sanctions are only necessary because of the particular consti-
tution of Western social life, and represent an inherently unjust impo-
sition when applied elsewhere. The injustice stems from the fact that, as 
Radcliffe-Brown sees it, persons, as social entities and subjects of ‘law’, 
are socially produced. The powers that they answer to, and the kinds 
of compliance they can be brought to, are therefore emanations of their 
particular forms of life, not universal or necessary traits of social life. 
By the same token, the oppressions and constraints of the prohibition 
era did not represent a necessary morality, but the product of a specific 
social order.
Approaches like this have a long history in anthropology. Bronisław 
Malinowski (1945), like Radcliffe-Brown, was of the view that sub-
jecting ‘savages’ to European law was unjustified, while almost four 
decades after Radcliffe-Brown’s lecture, Peter Lawrence (1969) voiced 
his concerns about the imposition of European legal systems in Papua 
New Guinea (see Demian and Rousseau 2019). Like Radcliffe-Brown, 
 Lawrence was concerned with the suitability of law to a different form 
of personhood and social life. ‘It is inevitable,’ he wrote, ‘that, unless 
New Guinea society is changed so that the citizen-isolate replaces the 
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kinsman or clansman, Australian Law . . . cannot function effectively 
in the country’ (1969: 35).
While anthropologists working broadly in the British school wor-
ried about the mismatch between European ideas about political order 
and local social structures, more radical voices were exploring the 
possibility that political life could have entirely different purposes and 
possi bilities to those ascribed to it in the West. Pierre Clastres’ (1987) 
Society against the State is probably the best known of this genre, and 
argues that Indigenous lowland Latin American societies are organised 
to prevent the establishment of institutionalised forms of domination. 
His ideas were enthusiastically adopted by Trotskyist thinkers attached 
to the Socialisme ou Barbarie group of Claude Lefort and Cornelius 
Castoriadis, who used them as a basis to reimagine socialist politics 
after they became disillusioned with the Soviet Union (Cova and 
Sarmiento Barletti 2021).
These two concerns with the cultural variability of politics – that 
societies are self-determining and that other peoples’ lives might hold 
radical possibilities – form the basis of the ‘ontological’ approach in 
anthropology championed by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2004). For 
Viveiros de Castro (2015), following Clastres and Gilles Deleuze, an-
other thinker influenced by Clastres (Cova and Sarmiento Barletti 2021), 
anthropology’s role is to establish a ‘permanent revolution’ in thought. 
This revolution consists in confronting Western epistemology with ver-
sions of the world that it cannot digest (Candea 2019), much as Clastres’ 
account of a politics that is not about power upends Western preconcep-
tions of the meaning of either term. These alternate worlds are imagined 
as ‘ontologies’ – that is, as conceptual systems defining their own re-
ality, which are of equal status to Western notions of  reality or nature. 
This establishes a kind of politics founded on difference itself, where 
the double meaning of ‘to differ’ – to be different and to  disagree – is 
exploited as the essence of political engagement ( Holbraad et al. 2014). 
In Viveiros de Castro’s thinking, the crucial  political relationship is 
therefore not a disagreement, over the meaning, values or rights of 
some definite thing or person, but a radical uncertainty or ‘equivoca-
tion’ about the nature of the thing at stake.
This perspective is diametrically opposed to the anthropology of 
the ‘suffering subject’ that Robbins (2013) outlines. This imagines a 
politics concerned with the common struggles of humans, organised 
around power, resistance and suffering. Politics in Viveiros de Castro’s 
account, by contrast, involves diverse contentions amongst people, who 
are categorically not ‘all of the same type’, over the nature of diverse 
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worlds. If the ‘suffering subject’ defines an anthropology of inequality, 
this ontological approach is one founded on alterity. By the same token, 
in this ‘ontological’ approach, social and cultural systems do not appear 
to be exterior and regulating in relation to human subjects, but consti-
tutive of them and their worlds. These worlds equally define the forms 
of politics appropriate to them, rendering politics multiple. As a result, 
it becomes ‘illegal’, in Viveiros de Castro’s (2015) terms, to suggest – or 
to look for – any kind of slippage between what people say they do, or 
what is required of them, and what they actually do (Holbraad 2014).
Compliance as an idea, however, requires the possibility of slippage. 
For someone to comply, there can be no such identity between people 
and the rules that they follow; compliance must involve the possibility 
of failure. Thus, Sampson, in this issue, draws attention to a recurrent 
question concerning corporate compliance regimes: are they genuine 
efforts to ‘do the right thing’, or simply façades to improve firms’ rep-
utations? (see also Bolten 2016). Indeed, he argues that part of the role 
of a corporate compliance department is to determine where corpora-
tions need sincerely to comply with norms or regulations, and where 
pretence is sufficient. Politics, in other words, is rendered multiple by 
focussing on the processes and networks of compliance, but it is not 
thereby rendered an automatic or logically necessary effect of social or 
conceptual systems.
In this regard, our notion of compliance bears a relationship to 
Charles Taylor’s (1999) reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1974) discus-
sion of following rules. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Taylor is sharply 
critical of models of rule-following that imply that it is either necessary 
and automatic, as in structural accounts of social life, or based on an 
intellectual grasp of the rule and its relation to the situations in which 
it might be applied, as Viveiros de Castro’s approach tends to imply 
(cf. Bourdieu 1977). He argues rather that rule-following is a kind of 
‘dialogical’ activity in which agency is distributed in a relationship (cf. 
Strathern 1988). This relationship is mediated by tacit understandings 
of the situation and its demands, the ‘rhythms’ of the exchanges that 
it involves (Garfinkel 1988; Schram 2018). His model for such relation-
ships, as in Larsen and Brøgger’s article in this issue, is dancing – and 
one can, of course, dance well or badly. Having two left feet signals the 
possible failure of compliance and the limits of making politics multiple 
by appealing to the ‘ontologies’ or cultures of groups of people. It is 
not who one is or where one comes from (Amazonia or Melanesia, for 
example) – in other words a social or conceptual system ‘at a higher 
level’ – that makes politics multiple and problematic. Rather, it is what 
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people do in the business of striving to accommodate themselves to 
one another – an activity that also forms them and their collective life 
while allowing for the ethnographically specific struggles, strategies 
and sufferings that the contributors to this issue highlight.
Conclusion
We began this introduction by raising the question of the surprising 
popular compliance with restrictions on everyday life aimed at limiting 
the spread of COVID-19 in the United Kingdom. We argued that this 
problem of compliance, although pressing, is one that, as a result of its 
particular intellectual history, anthropology has had difficulty in bring-
ing into focus. Compliance appeared either as a necessary condition of 
social analysis, or as an unremarked background against which to see 
human agency.
In order to make compliance accessible to anthropologists as an 
object of study, we proposed heuristically to define the term as that 
set of means by which actors strive to accommodate themselves to others in 
their collective life. We argued that this definition raises three interlinked 
questions: who are the actors concerned, by what means do they strive, 
and what is the nature of the collective constituted by their accommo-
dation? The answers to these questions are interlinked, such that asking 
about any aspect of compliance will call upon the others. Compliance 
is an optic through which to envisage collective life as a whole. Under-
standing how and why people complied with lockdown restrictions, 
therefore, is neither a matter of reading off British ‘culture’ or ‘society’ 
or the ‘political context’ in order to interpret what transpired. Nor is it 
a question, necessarily, of power imposed on people who are exterior to 
it. Rather, the ways in which people imagined themselves as susceptible 
to the disease (or not), their relationships to one another, the things that 
they had at their disposal (or not) to protect themselves and the use (or 
not) of these things and the wider network of employment, neighbour-
hood, newspaper readership, government and so on that made up their 
lives must all be mobilised to account for what they did. Or, to put it 
another way, compliance need neither be automatic, nor a background 
condition: tracing the set of means by which actors strive to accommodate 
themselves to others in their collective life is itself to delineate people, activ-
ity and collectivity, and the way in which these unfold in time.
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The value of this approach lies in its moderation. While it is clearly 
of a piece with relational, multi-species and ANT-inspired analyses, it 
engages squarely with a straightforward kind of politics that concerns 
policy, government and the management of populations. It is not, in 
other words, rooted in a singular and universal human subject, but nor 
does it bypass conventional understandings of politics. Responses to 
COVID-19 in the United Kingdom were evidently political – and often 
party political to boot – but the subjects of that politics were modified by 
the presence of a dangerous airborne virus that, amongst other  effects, 
drew attention to the common atmosphere they breathed.  Perhaps for 
the first time, British politics took place in the air.
As a result, mapping the specificity of particular compliances will 
inevitably serve to pluralise politics, to make politics about something 
other than ready-made notions of power or interest. This differentiation 
does not, however, compel us to think in terms of radical difference, 
or of whole communities of people or ‘ontologies’ that are irreducibly 
different from our own. Rather, it is a differentiation that is produced 
in practice by people striving to accommodate themselves to others in their 
collective life. These are strivings that are potentially connected, just as 
British people in 2020 almost certainly looked to Italy, Spain and China 
for their responses to the pandemic, just as their actions were ultimately 
connected to the international spread of the virus itself. They can also 
be seen to be unequal – not least in the difference in mortality rates 
between white and black Britons, or between wealthy and relatively 
poor people. By showing what compliance is and how it operates in 
and on social life, we ought therefore to be able to recover both specific 
forms of suffering and inequality and the ways in which social lives are 
constitutively different.
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Notes
1. There is more than a slight suggestion, which Freedman acknowledges, that 
UK citizens were complying with their understanding of other governments’ restric-
tions, since the then more stringent regulations in force in Italy and elsewhere were 
widely reported. By March 2020, a large amount of information about the virus, its 
behaviour, and measures taken against it in other countries was widely available.
2. Legal scholars have addressed questions of compliance under the rubric 
of legal consciousness studies (Ewick and Silbey 1991; Halliday and Morgan 2013; 
Silbey 2005).
3. Such relationships can easily be accounted for in terms of ‘power’, of course. 
Explanations that are based on implicit rather than observed forms of coercion – as 
in Max Weber’s notion of the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence – obscure as 
much as they reveal, however. Power tends to stand in for or obviate the actual 
relations that constitute compliance.
4. For Foucault (1991, 2009), of course, this distinction is more apparent than 
real at an operational level. He shows how the ‘governmentality’ of modern states 
is intimately linked to disciplinary regimes of the classical period. Here, we mean 
only to point to a contrast in the explicit evaluation of compliance between these 
two schools of thought, which, since Milton and Hobbes were contemporaries, evi-
dently transcends periodisation.
5. Fortes (2017) refers to himself as a structural anthropologist. Similar issues 
apply to French structuralism also (see Rubin 1975).
6. It is notable that Foucault, who as a theorist does insist on the constitutive 
role of social relations of power in the constitution of human subjects, is commonly 
understood by anthropologists mainly in terms of his earlier work as a theorist of 
institutions (Mahmood 2001), and not in light of his later writings on sexuality and 
ethics (Foucault 1994; Laidlaw 2002, 2014). 
7. ‘Actors’ in this context are to be understood as things that do something (de 
Vries 2016), and not only as bounded, human agents. We use this terminology to 
disrupt the assumption that compliance must necessarily involve a relationship 
between human individuals and exterior powers or forces but might take shape in 
any kind of relationship between things (including, but not limited to, people). The 
point here is to maintain compliance as a question, rather than a known phenome-
non, ‘not to decide who is acting and how but to shift from a certainty about action 
to an uncertainty about action’ (Latour 2005: 60).
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8. The implicit similarity between this framework and Roy Wagner’s (1972, 
1986) ‘obviation sequence’ is more than incidental. Each of the questions we propose 
‘obviates’ the others, acting as a point from which an image of the collective as a 
whole can be generated (see also Bateson 1958).
9. The term ‘associations’ is borrowed from Latour (2005). He uses it to desig-
nate the relationships that constitute collective life, but which are not necessarily 
‘social’ because they involve non-human actors. Latour reserves the idea of social 
relations for what circulates within this hybrid human and non-human milieu. 
This perspective is evidently similar to Garfinkel’s (1996) ethnomethodology. It also 
bears a strong relationship to Gabriel Tarde’s sociology as adopted by Latour (2005; 
see also de Vries 2016) and Candea (2010).
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